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SUMMARY
This discussion paper makes the case for investing in 
free universal childcare services of high quality in order 
to reduce gender inequality in earnings and employ-
ment. It estimates the employment-generating and 
fiscal effects of investing in free universal childcare 
in three middle income countries: South Africa, Uru-
guay and Turkey. It calculates the total annual costs 
of investing in high-quality childcare services that 
would cover the entire population of children below 
primary school age, using parameters relevant to 
each national context. Results show that employ-
ment rates can be significantly increased, especially 
for women, as a result of the combined direct, indirect 
and induced job creation. Although the total annual 
cost of such investment can go up to 3 to 4% of GDP, 
the net cost can be halved thanks to significant fiscal 
returns stemming from increased employment and 
earnings, without changing the tax structure itself 
(rates and bands). Results are compared with those 
obtained using a similar method for the UK and show 
that the reach of a country’s tax system plays an 
important role in the funding process. The paper also 
estimates a theoretical fiscal break-even point, based 
on longitudinal labour supply effects of mothers 
closing their lifetime employment and earning gap 
following such generous childcare offer. In all three 
countries and the UK, the fiscal return on investment 
based on this measure is likely to outstrip the total 
cost of childcare for a typical mother of two children 
on average earnings.
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1.
INTRODUCTION
This discussion paper describes the application to three middle-income countries of a method 
developed for the United Kingdom (UK) to estimate the annual fiscal cost of public invest-
ment in early childhood education and care (ECEC) services.1 It estimates direct and indirect 
employment effects and related increased tax revenues. It makes the case for providing 
universal and free public childcare services to contribute to building a care economy that will 
promote gender equality and high-quality employment. The three countries studied are South 
Africa, Turkey2 and Uruguay.
1.1 
Making the case for investing in universal childcare
Universal provision of high-quality affordable 
childcare is paramount to achieving some of the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) set out in 
the United Nations 2030 Agenda, including gender 
equality, quality education, well-being and health 
and reduced poverty. High-quality childcare services 
benefit young children from birth onwards, with 
cumulatively positive economic, social and well-being 
outcomes over their  life  course.3 External provision 
also allows more mothers to stay in or take up employ-
ment and earn a decent living by relieving some of 
their childcare constraints, fostering gender equality 
throughout their life.4 As a result, it offers a supply-
side solution to demand-oriented stimulus policies in 
times of chronic underemployment or recessions: Not 
only would investment in care services, and childcare 
in particular, create many more jobs than equivalent 
investment in more male-dominated industries such 
1 De Henau 2017a.
2 The results presented for Turkey derive from Ilkkaraçan, 
Kim and Kaya 2015 (hereafter IKK), which adopts a differ-
ent but comparable methodology in costing childcare and 
estimating the employment impact. A background paper 
for Turkey was prepared by Ilkkaraçan and Kim 2018 for this 
study.
3 Garcia et al. 2017; Havnes and Mogstad 2011, 2014; Karoly 
et al. 2005; Babchishin et al. 2013; Li et al. 2013; Melhuisch 
2004.
4 See De Henau and Himmelweit 2016 and De Henau 2017b 
for a discussion.
as construction, it would also release some of the 
supply-side caring constraints in taking up those jobs, 
more so than construction investment.5
These long-term and wider benefits of providing 
high-quality childcare services have led to calls for 
considering such spending as investment and such 
services as infrastructure—more precisely, social 
infrastructure.6 Social infrastructure includes those 
services such as health care, education, childcare and 
long-term care that create and maintain the social 
fabric of an economy, without which it cannot func-
tion, exactly as does the physical infrastructure of 
transport and communications equipment. However, 
despite evidence of long-term benefits, the care infra-
structure has long been neglected by policymakers 
when macroeconomic policies have been designed by 
governments and international institutions to prop 
up a country’s economy. In the 2010s austerity era (and 
even before the 2008 financial crisis), public spending 
on care services continued to be considered as a cost 
for the state in many countries, a burden that needed 
to be reduced through savings and privatization. Yet it 
is not clear that privatization of collective care provi-
sion (either to the commercial sector or to families) 
5 IKK 2015; De Henau et al. 2016, 2017.
6 De Henau et al. 2016; Ilkkaraçan 2017.
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has been in any way effective in delivering high-
quality and accessible care. In fact evidence points to 
the opposite, with unequal access and lower quality 
of care in countries relying more on private solutions.7
Because of this, the case for borrowing to invest public 
money in social infrastructure is not being heard and 
remains off the agenda of many countries’ economic 
policy plans. This contrasts with borrowing to invest in 
physical infrastructure, which is gaining more traction 
despite both types of investment yielding long-term 
benefits with positive externalities. Nevertheless, a 
growing number of organizations, think tanks and 
campaigners alike have become more vocal about 
reconsidering the rules for defining public investment 
versus public current expenditure, as highlighted by 
the UK Women’s Budget Group and others.8 Long-
term economic benefits enable the collection of 
net fiscal revenue that largely repays the borrowing 
required owing to increased employment of mothers, 
better career prospects for children and reduced social 
spending on other areas such as crime, health and 
social security benefits.9
Even the case for largely tax-funded collective services 
that would preserve current budgetary discipline 
through higher taxes (rather than spending cuts) has 
proven unpopular in a context of widespread ‘low- 
tax/low- spending’ rhetoric.10 Nevertheless, it is pos- 
7 Van Lancker 2013; Himmelweit 2013.
8 Elson 2017.
9 Garcia et al. 2017.
10 Streeck 2017.
sible to assess the extent to which investing public 
money into universal high-quality childcare services 
that are free at the point of use is ‘affordable’ in a short-
term or steady state mode if the budget orthodoxy is 
maintained. This entails calculating the amount of 
annual investment that can be recouped by increased 
tax revenue stemming from increased employment, 
earnings and consumption without changing the tax 
system. Bearing in mind that this would only be a small 
fraction of the multiple funding avenues, such fiscal 
effects are quantified in this paper and are discussed 
with respect to a wider arsenal of fiscal and monetary 
considerations that can be deployed to fund adequate 
childcare provision in a sustainable way. This discussion 
also includes an indication of how much of employ-
ment and earning gains would be needed over the 
lifetime for mothers (relative to a steady, unaffected 
pattern for fathers) to claw back the childcare costs in 
full, based on typical examples.
The paper starts by overviewing the main features of 
the current systems of childcare in the three countries 
studied. It then explains the method used to calcu-
late the costs and the specific assumptions for each 
country. It goes on to summarize the derivation of 
employment effects and examine the ways in which 
fiscal revenue can be accounted for. The final sections 
present the main results for the three countries stud-
ied and discuss them in comparison with the UK case.
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2. 
OVERVIEW OF 
CHILDCARE SYSTEMS
As part of wide-ranging strategies to improve child development and women’s employment, all 
three countries have designed national plans to expand coverage of early childhood education 
and care (ECEC) services, especially for children aged 3 and above and with priority given to 
children from disadvantaged backgrounds. Raising the quality of services was also highlighted as 
an important objective, including enforcing existing government norms and standards. Evidence 
from South Africa and Turkey showed some discrepancy between norms and existing practices, 
mostly in terms of qualification of staff and number of children per staff.
In Turkey, the policy focus has been more explicitly on 
promoting female employment by freeing up their 
childcare constraints. However, expansion plans have 
prioritized older preschool children, and current provi-
sion for children under the age of 3 remains dismal, 
as is typical of many other countries.11 In South Africa, 
the Government approved a National Integrated Early 
Childhood Development Policy in December 2015, 
covering all children from their mother’s pregnancy to 
when they enter primary school. The Policy’s empha-
sis is on development of the children rather than on 
promoting female employment. Expansion of ECEC 
service provision through centres focuses on children 
for the two years before they enter Grade R, the recep-
tion year that precedes Grade 1 of primary school. For 
younger children, the policy envisages a range of alter-
native services such as bi-weekly playgroup sessions 
and parenting programmes. In Uruguay, the situation 
is quite different. Childcare expansion started in the 
11 Ilkkaraçan and Kim 2018.
1990s and universal coverage was almost complete 
for 4- and 5-year-olds by 2015. Current policy explicitly 
aims to expand universal coverage to all 3-year-olds, 
extend opening hours for younger children and 
improve quality standards overall.
Primary education starts at about the age of 5.5 in 
Turkey, 6 in Uruguay and 6.5 in South Africa and is 
compulsory. In Uruguay, however, compulsory enrol-
ment in education starts at 4 (pre-primary education). 
In South Africa, a pre-primary reception class (Grade 
R) covers virtually all 5.5–6.5-year-olds, at least on a 
part-time basis. Before compulsory enrolment starts, 
ECEC coverage differs greatly between the three coun-
tries, albeit increasing with age, a pattern common to 
most countries across the world. Table 1 shows that 
enrolment rates are highest in Uruguay and lowest in 
Turkey for both 0–2-year-olds and the older age group.
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TABLE 2-1 
Overview of current ECEC service provision in South Africa, Turkey and Uruguay (circa 2015)
South Africa Turkey Uruguay
0–2 years 3–5 years 0–2 years 3–5 years 0–2 years 3–5 years
Enrolment rate 19% 64% 0.2% 36% 39% 92%
Hours per week 35-50 35-50 35-45 35-45 
(20 for nursery 
classes)
20-30 40 
Child/staff ratios 8 (0–17 
months)
13 (18–35 
months)
16 7 (private) 13 (private) 19 
(public)
8 (6–17 
months)
14 (18–35 
months)
14 (36–47 
months)
Qualification 
of childcare 
practitioner
Below upper 
secondary 
school
Below upper 
secondary 
school
Post-
secondary
Post-
secondary
Post-
secondary
Post-
secondary
Public spending 
(% GDP)
0.09% (0.15% if including Grade 
R for 6-year-olds)
0.18% 0.22% (0–47 months) (+0.38% for 
4–5-year-olds)
Source: Figures provided by national experts (see Appendix 1 for complete sources).
Coverage differences are reflected in the size of cur-
rent public spending on ECEC services as a proportion 
of gross domestic product (GDP). Public spending in 
South Africa relative to enrolment is the lowest of 
the three countries, mainly because staff qualifica-
tion and pay are much lower than in the other two 
(and actually lower in practice for the majority of 
practitioners than what is stipulated in the national 
norms and standards (N&S)). The other reason is that 
the government contribution is framed as a means-
tested ‘subsidy’ to cater for children from low-income 
families rather than covering the full cost of service 
provision. Provision is mainly delivered through not-
for-profit organizations and not all children enrolled 
in ECEC services receive the subsidy, which has not 
increased for several years even in nominal terms and 
is based on the expectation of parental co-payments. 
In Turkey and Uruguay, ECEC service provision is for 
the most part publicly financed and delivered. In Tur-
key, provision for young children (0–2 years) is virtually 
non-existent and private for-profit institutions cover 
the few children who are enrolled. By contrast, for the 
3-5 age group—where coverage is much better—85 
per cent of children attending ECEC services do so in 
public institutions. Shorter hours are found for very 
young children in Uruguay, but plans to increase them 
have been developed. Interestingly, despite these dif-
ferences, child/staff ratios and opening hours are 
broadly similar by age group in all three countries. The 
opening hours shown in Table 1 are averages of typical 
day-care services.
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3.
CHILDCARE COSTING 
METHOD
Using a bottom-up approach that focuses on the specificities of each country, this paper 
estimates the costs of providing free full-time universal childcare services for children under 
primary school age (or under the age of compulsory enrolment in the education system, as 
in the case of Uruguay). The model is described in detail in De Henau (2017a) and assumes 
centre-based day-care provision that reflects a typical modality of service in each country. We 
estimate different scenarios combining different coverage rates for children of different ages, 
different levels of qualification and pay for childcare workers and different child/staff ratios 
for each age group of children. The model also includes additional costs for non-contact time 
and for support staff (cooking, cleaning) and overhead costs as well as provision for additional 
training and building costs where relevant.
3.1 
Parameters retained
The cost of provision in a typical ECEC centre depends 
on six main elements:
1.  Number of children to be offered a place
2. Opening hours per week (and per year)
3. Children to staff ratios, which typically vary by 
child age
4. Working time of staff, taking account of non-
contact time of childcare staff (time away 
from children’s supervision for training and 
administration)
5. Level of remuneration and qualification of staff 
(including auxiliary staff such as cooks, cleaners 
and admin), as well as cost of initial training for 
qualified childcare staff and other wage costs 
such as employers’ social security contributions, 
sick pay and holiday pay)
6. Non-staff costs (overhead), including infrastruc-
ture costs (construction, rent and maintenance).
The main parameters that are set to vary in the differ-
ent scenarios are the enrolment rates for different age 
groups, the level of qualification and pay of the staff 
and the child/staff ratios. In order to avoid too many 
scenarios, we have retained only one (maximum) set 
of opening hours. In Uruguay, contact time is set at 
40 hours per week for 52 weeks (20 hours for children 
aged 0–6 months). For South Africa, it is slightly higher 
at 45 hours per week in order to reflect more typical 
full-time working weeks and commuting time;12 year-
round coverage is assumed to be 49 weeks (typical 
three-week holiday period). In both countries, this 
would correspond to slightly longer opening hours 
than currently available and would cover the whole 
year, including during school holidays. In Turkey, the 
simulated expansion plan assumes current opening 
12 Former Apartheid-era spatial planning is still responsible 
for longer commuting times as economic activity happens 
mainly in the former ‘white’ areas, while poor black people 
live far away on the periphery with inadequate public 
transport.
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hours, which are around 35-45 hr a week for preschool 
kindergartens and day-care centres.13 Also, all staff in 
childcare centres are assumed to work full time on a 
40-hour-per-week basis.14
Overhead costs are taken as the value of inputs that 
are not wage costs of directly employed staff. They 
are fixed at the current level of a typical centre and 
estimated separately for each country. This assumes 
that raising the wages of childcare staff in different 
scenarios does not increase the cost of supplying 
materials. Typical overhead costs in existing facilities 
in South Africa are estimated at 50 per cent of total 
costs based on evidence from an audit of existing 
childcare centres.15 In Turkey, overheads account for 
65 per cent of total costs, based on a field survey of 
private settings.16 By contrast, in Uruguay, the share of 
intermediate inputs required by a typical public ECEC 
centre is estimated at only 22 per cent of total costs, 
reflecting higher wages for childcare practitioners and 
other staff compared to the other two countries and 
economies of scale for administrative and building 
costs.17 These proportions for South Africa and Turkey 
will be lower once higher wages are factored into our 
various scenarios (see section 6 below).
3.2 
Scenarios retained
Because we use a bottom-up approach that reflects 
country specificities and priorities, the scenarios 
retained are not exactly the same across countries 
but they share similar objectives of a less and a more 
generous option for each criterion: 
 • Medium enrolment rates (that is, higher than cur-
rent figures shown in Table 1) versus full enrolment 
rate (universal)
 • Current qualification and pay levels for different 
childcare workers versus improved qualification and 
13 Public nursery classes for 5-year-olds, which are located in 
primary schools, operate on a half-day schedule. Students 
are enrolled in either the morning or the afternoon seg-
ment and have only four hours of contact on a daily basis. 
Although our model assumes a publicly run system, we 
have taken the more generous full-time opening hours of 
private settings as the benchmark for public expansion, in 
line with the IKK model.
14 This in principle does not preclude part-time employment 
and job sharing as the number of jobs created is calculated 
in full-time equivalent. However, for the purpose of income 
tax and social security calculations, we have assumed 
full-time jobs. In progressive individual tax systems, two 
part-time jobs are not equivalent to one full-time job on 
a given hourly wage because the average income tax inci-
dence is higher the higher the income.
pay (except for Turkey, for which only one scenario 
of higher pay is estimated)
 • Current child/staff ratios versus statutory ratios or 
improved standards if no legal requirement (except 
for Turkey, with ratios based on standards only).
Given that the options can be chosen independently 
for each parameter, a total of eight scenarios can be 
estimated. However, we have only retained the most 
relevant combinations. Below is the detail of those 
calculations for each country. 
15 EPRI 2014.
16 Carried out by IKK 2015.
17 Plan CAIF 2015.
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3.3 
Specific costing parameters 
South Africa
The current system in South Africa is characterized by 
a low proportion of qualified staff at the level of norms 
and standards requested nationally (which is one year 
post-secondary school, to reach level 5 of the National 
Qualification Framework – NQF5). Only 5 per cent of 
childcare staff at best reached that level in 2014 while 
the remaining 95 per cent (whether main practitioners 
or assistants) have achieved secondary school level or 
below.18 The higher-qualification scenario assumes a 
50-50 split between staff at NQF5 level (for main prac-
titioner) and staff at NQF4 level, which is equivalent to 
upper secondary school (for assistant).
Three pay level scenarios are used:19
 • Low: with less-qualified staff on the minimum 
wage paid in the Expanded Public Works 
Programmes (EPWP) (equivalent to about 20 per 
cent of mean annual earnings)20 and more qualified 
staff paid at NQF5 average level in education (about 
100 per cent of mean earnings)
 •Medium: with less-qualified staff paid at the new 
2018 national minimum wage (double that of the 
EPWP) and more qualified staff on the same pay as 
the low-pay scenario (NQF5)
18 EPRI 2014.
19 Estimates of qualified practitioners’ pay provided by Martin 
Gustafsson (University of Stellenbosch) and adjusted 
by government salary adjustment rates for the relevant 
years to arrive at a 2017 salary. Minimum wages are as per 
planned national legislation: EPWP workers on ZAR 11 per 
hour and national minimum wage on ZAR 20 (Republic of 
South Africa 2017).
20 See Appendix 2 for details on how the mean earnings of 
employees are estimated.
 • High: with less-qualified staff on the same pay as 
the medium pay scenario and more qualified staff 
qualified and paid at NQF7, which corresponds to 
primary school teacher levels (about 300 per cent of 
mean earnings).
Child/staff ratios and enrolment rates are made to 
vary according to the age of the child (Table 2). Child/
staff ratios depend on the age of the child, and cur-
rent ratios are well above the government-stipulated 
norms and standards (N&S).21 
Three scenarios for enrolment rates are considered for 
each age group. The medium scenario corresponds to 
the objective of enrolling two thirds of pre-Grade R 
children (which is roughly the proportion of children 
living in poverty),22 scaled in such a way as to reflect 
greater coverage for older children than for younger 
children. The average size of a typical centre assumed 
for South Africa is 45 children.
21 EPRI 2014; 4Chakras Consulting 2010.
22 In 2015, 67 per cent of children under 18 were living in 
poverty according to Statistics South Africa 2017. This does 
not mean that the proportion is the same for pre-Grade R 
children, but it is the best recent official source of approxi-
mation available.
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TABLE 3-1 
Scenarios of child/staff ratios and enrolment rates, South Africa
 Child age Child/staff ratios Enrolment rates
Current N&S Current Medium Universal
0–17 months 8 3 10% 33% 100%
18–35 months 13 6 30% 60% 100%
36–65 months 16 10 60% 90% 100%
Source: see Appendix 1 for details.
Uruguay
Comparable scenarios have been selected for Uru-
guay, although a slightly different method has been 
used in order to retain some of the specificities of an 
already well-developed public system of provision. The 
cost calculations reflect three main types of settings: 
large centres (hosting 144 children) account for 75 per 
cent of children enrolled; medium settings (hosting 
72 children) for about 20 per cent; and small settings 
(hosting 36 children) for 5 per cent.23
Current childcare staff pay levels are such that assis-
tant childcare staff are paid on average 90 per cent 
of national mean earnings and main practitioners 
170 per cent.24 A higher-pay scenario applies the pay 
level used in pre-primary education (‘educación ini-
cial’) of university-level qualified staff (‘docentes’) to 
childcare main practitioners and less qualified level 
(‘no docentes’) to assistant practitioners.25 In such 
a scenario, assistants would be paid 100 per cent of 
average earnings and main practitioners twice as 
much. There is therefore a much lower difference 
between the ‘low’ and ‘high’ pay scenarios than in 
the case of South Africa.
23 Plan CAIF 2015.
24 Plan CAIF 2016. See Table A.4 in Appendix I.
25 ANEP 2017.
The parameters that provide the bulk of the variation 
in results in the Uruguayan case are the child/staff 
ratios and the enrolment rates (Table 3). Varying the 
proportion of main practitioners in each age group also 
affects the outcome. Main practitioners are assumed to 
account for 50 per cent of childcare workers for children 
aged 18 months and above and for 33 per cent of staff 
for younger children, except in the scenarios retaining 
‘ideal’ child/staff ratios, for which 50 per cent main 
practitioners is assumed in all age groups.
Children aged 0–5 months are assumed to enrol on 
a part-time basis. The take-up is expected to be low 
anyway at that age, given maternity leave provision of 
about 14 weeks.26 Older children are offered a place for 
40 hours a week. Scenarios for enrolment rates vary 
between current coverage27 and universal coverage. 
An intermediate scenario is suggested with 33 per 
cent for 0–5-month-olds, 66 per cent for the rest of 
under 3s and 100 per cent for 3 years and above.
26 Batthyány and Perrotta 2015. This means that our estimates 
could be seen as 100 per cent of half the children aged 0–6 
months covered in full-time places or all children taking 
half-time places. Either way these provide upper bounds of 
take-up, which is the aim of the simulations (we estimate 
potential rather than actual enrolment). Note that paid 
maternity leave also exists in the other two countries: 
Turkey (8–13 weeks post birth at 67 per cent) and South 
Africa (3–4 months post birth at 38-60 per cent with a cap). 
As these are slightly less generous, we have calculated full-
time childcare provision since birth in these two countries.
27 This is already above the OECD average and the European 
Union targets of 33 per cent for 0–2-year-olds and 90 per 
cent for 3–5-year-olds
investing in free universal childcare 
in south africa, turkey and uruguay 9
TABLE 3-2 
Scenarios for child/staff ratios and enrolment rates, Uruguay 
 Child/staff ratios Enrolment rates
 Basic Improved Ideal Current Medium Universal
0-5 months 4 3 3 11% 33% 100%
6-17 months 8 6 3 30% 66% 100%
18-35 months 12 8 4 55% 66% 100%
36-47 months 14 12 8 77% 100% 100%
Source: see Appendix 1 for details.
Turkey
The Turkish case28 assumes a typical centre hosting 
100 children. Child/staff ratios retained are based 
on legal requirement of five children aged 0–2 and 
10 aged 3–5 per practitioner (one main practitioner 
and one assistant for 10 children 0–2 and for 20 
children 3–5). A minimum of five non-childcare staff 
per day-care centre is also assumed. Qualification 
levels are roughly as current, with main practitioners 
qualified at university degree level and assistant prac-
titioners at secondary school level. Enrolment rates in 
the medium scenario assume OECD averages for each 
age group (in 2014).
TABLE 3-3 
Scenarios for child/staff ratios and enrolment rates, Turkey
 Child/staff ratios Enrolment rates
 N&S OECD Universal
0–2-year-olds 5 33% 100%
3–5-year-olds 10 83% 100%
Source: see Appendix 1 for details.
28 See IKK 2015 for details of the original method and 
Ilkkaraçan and Kim 2018 for the background paper to these 
revised costings.
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Although heavily based on the costings provided by 
IKK (2015), the adapted model here diverges from IKK 
in the following ways:
 • Costings are estimated for the entire provision of 
ECEC on the relevant population. This means the 
model assumes an overhaul of current provision, 
for which improved N&S are imposed on pay and 
child/staff ratios. This is in line with the costing 
method used for South Africa and Uruguay. Costing 
calculations in IKK (2015) and Ilkkaraçan and Kim 
(2018) only included the expansion plan.
 • We follow Ilkkaraçan and Kim (2018) by using higher 
wages compared to IKK (2015). The higher wages 
correspond to median full-time earnings in early 
education services (main practitioners paid about 
2.5 times more than median earnings in the whole 
economy and assistants paid just above average 
earnings).29
 • All ECEC workers are assumed to be registered for 
social security and thus the wage costs include 
employer social security contributions for all jobs in 
the new ECEC system.
 • Despite higher wages, the amount of overhead 
costs (non-staff) per centre is kept at the level 
estimated in IKK (2015). This means that wage costs 
in the scenarios of this paper are a greater propor-
tion of the total costs of a centre compared to IKK 
(2015). As a result, overheads fall to 40 per cent of 
total costs, compared to 65 per cent in IKK.
29 With less qualified staff paid at lower level than degree 
qualified staff, the ratio of which maps that found in IKK 
2015.
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4.
EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS
The primary objective of investing in free universal ECEC services is to provide accessible and 
quality education and care services to foster the life chances and well-being of young children. 
Employment creation is a secondary objective that could be considered, fostering the syner-
gies between ECEC and employment generation. In practice, though, it is often the primary 
objective of policymakers, subordinated to available fiscal space.
Even as an employment-generating policy, childcare 
provision has traditionally been seen only from a 
labour supply perspective in many countries, as 
activation policy, with provision of affordable and 
accessible childcare deemed to reduce the caring con-
straints of mothers—especially lone mothers—and 
thus foster their attachment to the labour market.30 
More recently, some economists have revived and 
tweaked a classic Keynesian macroeconomic argu-
ment, whereby public expansion of ECEC services 
also addresses an issue of labour demand by creat-
ing employment directly and indirectly, in the same 
way that investing in physical infrastructure is seen 
as employment stimulus policy.31 These studies have 
shown that the employment creation effects in differ-
ent countries of investing a fraction of GDP in social 
infrastructure such as care services were larger than 
those stemming from an equivalent investment in 
physical infrastructure, owing to the higher labour 
intensity of the former.
Considering investment in childcare as an employ-
ment policy as much as a child development policy is 
particularly relevant to countries such as South Africa 
and Turkey in which the female employment rate is 
much lower than in other middle- and high-income 
countries, respectively at 37 per cent and 31 per cent, 
compared to 60 per cent for OECD average and 69 
30 Thévenon 2013.
31 Antonopoulos et al. 2011; IKK 2015; De Henau et al. 2016.
per cent in the United Kingdom.32 As noted in the IKK 
study, the drive behind the childcare expansion plan in 
Turkey was explicitly about increasing female labour 
force participation. The female employment rate in 
Uruguay stood at about 63 per cent in 2016 and was 
73 per cent for women aged 25 to 60.33 
Investing in social infrastructure rather than physi-
cal infrastructure is also likely to reduce the gender 
employment gap by raising women’s employment 
rates more than men’s. This is due to persistent gender 
segregation observed in all countries between those 
two sectors, with more women than men expected 
to take up jobs in childcare services.34 The gender 
employment gap—measured here as the difference 
between the employment rates of women and men 
of working age—stood at about 38 points in Turkey 
in 2016, compared to 14 in Uruguay, 12 in South Africa 
and 9 in the United Kingdom.35 
The employment effects of direct public investment 
in ECEC services are threefold:
 • direct creation of jobs in the childcare sector
 • indirect creation of jobs in industries supplying the 
childcare sector
32 OECD 2017a.
33 INE 2018a. This is an estimate for the population aged 
14–64 as the official employment rate published by the 
Uruguayan statistical office only reports employment 
rates for those aged 14 and above (which was 50 per cent 
for women and 68 per cent for men).
34 De Henau et al. 2016.
35 OECD 2017a; INE 2018a.
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 • induced job creation stemming from increased 
consumption out of the earnings of the newly 
employed ECEC staff and indirect jobs.
The method used in this paper is based on an 
input-output analysis to derive indirect and induced 
employment multipliers (which is the number of jobs 
created indirectly for every job created directly).36
These effects can be simulated and will typically 
depend on the parameters of the scenario. Roughly 
speaking:
 • The larger the increase in enrolment rates and the 
lower the child/staff ratios, the higher the direct 
employment creation (since more staff are needed 
for each group of children).
 • The higher the overhead costs as a proportion 
of staff costs, the larger the indirect job creation 
(note, however, that these have been fixed for each 
country across the various scenarios so that indirect 
job creation will not vary with changes in wages, 
only with the number of centres needed, and thus 
the enrolment rates).
 • The larger the increase in the wages of childcare 
workers, the larger the induced employment 
multiplier (increased earnings for increased 
consumption).
We have estimated both indirect and induced effects 
for all three countries, albeit with specific assump-
tions depending on data availability in each country 
(see appendices for details). It is important to note 
that such effects capture labour demand aspects. 
The model does not estimate whether these jobs 
would be taken up and by whom, except for reflecting 
existing gender segregation in different industries. It 
effectively assumes that all jobs can be and will be 
taken up by women and men who are underemployed 
(unemployed or inactive but constrained by caring 
36 Full details of how this is done can be found in De Henau et 
al. 2016.
duties). IKK (2015) carried out a more refined analysis 
for Turkey with individual job-matching and earning 
estimations to capture the heterogeneity of potential 
new workers (limited to direct and indirect effects in 
their 2015 study). In this paper, on the other hand, we 
have allocated earnings to newly employed people 
(technically job vacancies by gender) on the basis of 
the average earnings in each sector wherever possible 
(or for the economy as a whole) and, for direct jobs in 
childcare, the respective level of pay per qualification 
in each scenario.
Although impact analysis using input-output tables 
relies on strong assumptions about a stable indus-
trial structure (in prices and production technology), 
which some argue are too restrictive and implausible, 
the case for investing in the childcare industry in par-
ticular alleviates some of these issues for three main 
reasons. First, it offers a solution to the assumption of 
no supply constraints, given that the main labour sup-
ply constraint of caregivers—chiefly affordable and 
accessible childcare—would be somewhat relaxed. 
Second, we do not expect much change in produc-
tion technology and thus relative prices of inputs 
in the economy given that childcare is essentially a 
final product, hardly feeding into other industries. 
Therefore, even at high unit costs of production (in 
the higher-quality scenarios), we do not expect this to 
affect the structure of the supply chain significantly. 
Third, induced employment effects derived from 
average households’ consumption patterns are often 
argued to be overestimated because the propensity of 
consumption of households whose members would 
see an increase in earnings is not the same as the 
country average. It is, however, difficult to evaluate the 
degree of overestimation and, given the scale of the 
employment creation, it is possible that households 
across a wide range of incomes benefit from increased 
earnings and so their propensity to consume and pat-
tern of spending may not be far off the average.37 
37 See De Henau and Himmelweit 2016 for a more detailed 
discussion.
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5. 
FISCAL EFFECTS
Funding public childcare provision requires tax revenue. While it may be possible to mobilize 
a number of sources for immediate funding, including international aid and financial markets, 
public spending on childcare will ultimately have to be funded by tax. It can either be current, 
by raising the tax intake necessary to fund the annual cost of running the system contem-
poraneously (the usual ‘current expenditure’ way), or it can be borrowed against future net 
fiscal revenue (the ‘investment’ way). Either way, it is often considered or portrayed as though 
funding requires raising tax rates (or cutting spending elsewhere), either now or in the future 
respectively, and as such may prove politically sensitive. However, the case made here is 
that the benefits of such provision are large enough to claw back the original (and annual) 
investment, when considering both short-term and long-term effects, without modification 
of the fiscal structure.38 Short-term, cross-sectional fiscal effects are to do with the immediate 
employment creation and boost to aggregate demand on a year-by-year basis, which yields 
increased tax revenue (and reduced social security spending on out-of-work benefits if any). 
Long-term, longitudinal effects stem from improved lifetime earnings of those children and 
their parents (mainly mothers)—and thus tax intake—as well as reduced social spending on 
physical and social protection owing to better health, safety and social security outcomes.
5.1 
Longitudinal effects
Assessment of fiscal feasibility of public investment 
programmes often takes the view, to justify bor-
rowing, that wider long-term benefits will accrue 
in the form of economic growth and greater social 
well-being and thus higher tax revenue and reduced 
public spending. In the same way, private investors 
calculate the difference between the present value 
of future benefits38 (net of any interest repayments) 
and the cost of the project to determine whether it is 
worth investing or not. In the case of public finance, 
a programme of public childcare investment could be 
evaluated by looking at a series of future benefits that 
will materialize in the form of increased tax revenue 
and reduced public spending in other domains. For 
38 De Henau 2017a
example, James Heckman and his team39 have argued, 
and demonstrated with longitudinal experiments, 
that the long-term benefits of high-quality childcare 
programmes targeted at disadvantaged children in 
the United States include:
 • higher human capital and thus earnings for the 
children who benefited from the programme (com-
pared to a control group that did not benefit from it 
but otherwise equivalent), over their life course
 • accrued earnings of caregivers (mothers) of the 
beneficiaries who could remain attached to 
the labour market and thus who did not suffer 
39 See Garcia et al. 2017 for most recent findings.
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cumulative earning penalties over their life course, 
unlike those in the control group
 • reduced spending on various services that would 
otherwise be spent to tackle cumulative disadvan-
tages ( justice system, mental and physical health 
care, welfare payments).
Assessing such long-term benefits empirically for 
our three countries is well beyond the scope of this 
paper. Methodological issues, pertaining to the uni-
versal scope of the programme, would also need to be 
addressed. Indeed the magnitude of benefits for chil-
dren would be reduced as universal coverage includes 
those children not from disadvantaged background 
whose parents could be in full-time employment 
anyway (substituting private or informal childcare for 
public childcare), and who would be less exposed to 
social and health risks. However, it would still be pos-
sible to evaluate the existence of net positive benefits 
for disadvantaged children, calibrated on Heckman’s 
method, and to add to them the cost of provision for 
the other children.
Even if some children would not see additional ben-
efits compared to what they would otherwise get, 
perhaps the more widespread effects of free universal 
childcare are the parental gains in employment, in the 
form of lifetime earnings. High-quality free childcare 
provision is likely to be taken up by many mothers, 
enabling them to increase or retain more of their 
previous earnings, thereby reducing the child-related 
earnings penalty that currently applies to most 
mothers, even those who are highly educated and 
well-paid.40
Data limitations (chiefly, longitudinal employment 
and earning surveys) prevent us from estimating such 
gains accurately here. So instead we estimate a theo-
retical break-even point for typical mothers. That is 
we estimate the minimum number of years a mother 
would need to stay in full-time employment after the 
birth of her child to provide a minimum increase in 
fiscal revenue (direct and indirect tax) that would 
40 Costa Dias et al. 2016; Kleven et al. 2018; Boll et al. 2017.
claw-back the total cost of childcare, compared to the 
current gender employment penalty that is observed 
in each country. We provide estimates based on the 
following conservative assumptions: 
 • The total cost of childcare per child is calculated 
in various costing scenarios over the full period 
of potential enrolment. A typical example of two 
children in childcare is used.
 • The average earning potential is set at average males 
earnings (used as a proxy for the benchmark earning 
from which a mother departs at her first child’s birth, 
which is the basis of the gap to be closed).
The minimum number of years of full-time earnings 
required to break even fiscally is the ratio of the total 
cost of childcare and the difference between the total 
tax due on the annual earnings potential and that on 
the current average annual earnings of all women. The 
tax revenue accounted for includes direct personal 
income taxes (as well as social security contributions) 
and indirect expenditure taxes.
So, for example, if five years of state-funded universal 
childcare are provided until primary school, costing the 
state, say, $10,000 per year per child in real terms, the 
total childcare cost for two children would be $80,000 
(in today’s prices). Let’s say average male earnings are 
$25,000 a year. This is taken as the level of real-term 
earning potential a woman without child-related earn-
ing penalty could command over her career (in todays’ 
prices). The average total tax on this would be, say 
$12,500 per year (indirect and direct taxes). However 
the actual current annual income of all women who 
have had a child is, say $5,000, in today’s prices (averag-
ing across employed and non-employed women). The 
average total tax on this would be just say $1000 (low 
tax rate because low income, likely to be below direct 
tax thresholds, so mainly consumption tax). Therefore 
the minimum number of years a woman with two chil-
dren in childcare would need to remain at her earnings 
potential in order for the policy to break even fiscally is 
80,000 / (12,500 – 1000) = 7 years. 
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5.2 
Cross-sectional effects
It is important to note that these longitudinal fiscal 
considerations come from a labour-supply perspective: 
The focus is on how much a mother would change 
her employment pattern and thus potentially achieve 
higher earning over the lifetime if her child could ben-
efit from universal high-quality childcare. This requires 
that there are enough jobs to be created or returned 
to. As discussed above, we also adopt a labour-demand 
perspective by looking at the number of jobs created. 
Therefore it is also possible to calculate the fiscal effects 
of such employment expansion and compare them to 
the total cost on a year-by-year basis. 
These short-term, contemporaneous fiscal effects 
include:
 • increased income tax revenue from additional 
earnings (including increased social security 
contributions of both employees and employers)
 • increased indirect tax revenue from consumption 
(value added tax – VAT, excise duties and other 
expenditure taxes for households)41
 • reduced spending on social security benefits for 
those previously unemployed or on low income who 
have taken up the new jobs.
The latter effect would require some estimation of 
labour supply reactions to determine how many 
of those not currently in employment would ben-
efit from the investment, taking into account the tax 
incentive structure of any social security benefits they 
receive (that is, their effective participation tax rates). 
Tax-benefit simulation tools could help with such 
estimations but are costly to build for each country 
so we have not considered this effect for the three 
41 This gain is from the increased consumption of the 
newly employed people. Another consumption gain not 
modelled here is that mothers using universal free child-
care would no longer spend on childcare services, thereby 
shifting spending away from childcare payments that are 
often zero-rated for VAT or attract tax relief and towards 
other goods and services that attract VAT, with potentially 
additional positive net effects on tax revenue.
countries studied. We did, however, consider it for our 
comparator country, the United Kingdom, as shown in 
the discussion at the end.
The model here concentrates on estimating the fiscal 
effects from income tax, social security contributions 
and consumption taxes based on estimated earnings 
(and propensity to consume) of the newly employed 
people. In doing so, both employment and fiscal 
effects are calculated net of existing provision. This 
means that although the annual gross investment 
is for a system built from scratch (the actual amount 
that would have to be paid each year), the figure for 
the employment effects are net of the existing jobs 
in childcare. The same holds for fiscal effects: We only 
consider the additional tax revenue from additional 
earnings and expenditure. We also deduct current 
public spending on existing childcare services for the 
age group covered since these will be replaced by the 
new, more generous, system.
It is important to note that these short-term employ-
ment and fiscal effects are by no means short lived. 
They are called short-term in the sense that they 
are cross-sectional. This means that for every year of 
spending, the tax revenue occurs contemporaneously 
on a sustained basis, in contrast to the long-term 
effects that take account of the cumulative returns 
over the life cycle. This steady-state calculation does 
not preclude the possibility for gradual implementa-
tion in practice. Universal coverage at higher levels of 
pay can be rolled out in phases, starting by covering 
a fraction of the child population and paying staff 
at current rates, with gradual above-inflation pay 
rises as the system develops and qualifications are 
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improved.42 The same goes for upfront costs of build-
ing such a system: Initial training costs and building 
costs are included in the calculations of total costs 
and annualized in the form of debt repayments, in 
order for the outlay to happen at the start.43  
42 This is in practice what policymakers may want to do, but 
it is good to have a final, steady-state figure for planning 
purposes. For example, the Women’s Equality Party in the 
United Kingdom, a fringe feminist political party that pre-
sented a programme at the general elections in 2017 that 
adopted our suggested universal childcare scenario, took 
the view of a gradual implementation of the system, start-
ing with a lower pay that was increased after a few years 
to reach the higher quality system (Women’s Equality Party 
2017).
43 See De Henau 2017a for more details.
Given the specificities of the country parameters, 
results are presented separately for each country. 
A discussion follows that compares some of these 
results with those of the UK calculations.
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6. 
RESULTS
6.1 
South Africa
Table 5 shows that the variation in gross annual investment is significant between the 
scenarios and depends mainly on the level of pay since the high-pay scenario assumes that 
the more qualified staff earn three times as much as in the medium pay scenario. Scenario 1 
serves as a benchmark for the other scenarios, with an expansion of current provision to all 
children but with low-quality parameters reflecting current practices. The most achievable 
scenarios are the two scenarios using medium pay levels (scenarios 2 and 3), and we have 
costed them using the 50-50 split of qualified practitioners/assistants and abiding by the 
norms and standards with regard to child/staff ratios, given the objective of improving service 
quality. Medium enrolment rates (scenario 2) would entail gross annual investment worth 1.8 
per cent of GDP, while universal coverage (scenario 3) would increase the annual spending to 
3.2 per cent of GDP. 
Note that the high-pay universal scenario (scenario 4) 
would entail public spending on childcare going up to 
7.3 per cent of GDP. Although unrealistic, it would cre-
ate 3 million full-time jobs—half of which would be 
in sectors other than childcare—and boost the female 
employment rate by 12 percentage points, thereby 
reducing the 11 percentage-point gender employment 
gap to just 4 points. However, the medium pay level 
universal scenario (scenario 3) offers similarly attrac-
tive employment results with a 10 percentage-point 
increase in the female employment rate and the gen-
der employment gap reduced to 4 percentage points 
as well. Given that female employment rates were at 
a low 38 per cent in early 2017 (49 per cent for men), 
these increases would be no small achievement.
Short-term fiscal effects are sensitive to the level of 
pay of childcare staff. The strongly skewed earning 
distribution in South Africa and the structure of its 
progressive income tax schedule—with the vast 
majority of earnings found below the first income 
tax threshold—is reflected in the low income tax 
intake, which is, in the first three scenarios, lower 
than the indirect tax revenue. The more expensive 
higher-pay scenario 4 offers a better fiscal return as 
the many direct jobs of qualified practitioners attract 
significantly more tax revenue owing to wages that 
are three times as high as in the case of the otherwise 
equivalent medium pay scenario 3.
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TABLE 6-1 
Gross and net investment in childcare provision, South Africa (2017)
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Enrolment rates Universal Medium Universal Universal
Child/staff ratio Current N&S N&S N&S
Pay level Low Medium Medium High
% qualified staff 5% 50% 50% 50%
Gross annual investment 2,647 6,314 11,347 25,740
% GDP 0.8% 1.8% 3.2% 7.3%
Direct tax revenue 222 750 1,376 5,824
Indirect tax revenue 460 1,315 2,428 5,014
Current ECEC funding 201 201 201 201
Net funding gap 1,765 4,048 7,343 14,702
% GDP 0.5% 1.2% 2.1% 4.2%
% self-funding 33% 36% 35% 43%
No. new full-time jobs 871,347 1,230,781 2,329,087 3,077,490
ECEC 670,175 807,937 1,558,574 1,558,574
Other sectors 201,172 422,844 770,514 1,518,917
% pts empl. rate change 2.4% 3.3% 6.3% 8.4%
% pts empl. rate change women 4.0% 5.3% 10.1% 12.0%
Notes: (1) N&S stands for norms and standards requirements; (2) employment rates change is for the population aged 15-64; (3) 
monetary amounts are in US$ millions (2017).
6.2 
Uruguay
Given the lower degree of variation in pay levels 
compared to South Africa, the main factor that dif-
ferentiates the overall cost of each scenario is the 
child/staff ratio (Table 6). Scenario 1 represents an 
expansion of provision to all children but keeping the 
parameters of staffing and pay as per the existing 
system. Scenario 4 represents the ideal scenario of 
universal high-quality coverage for all children under 
the age of 4. This would entail an annual investment 
of 2.8 per cent of GDP.
It is worth recalling that the calculations for Uruguay 
only cover the 0–3-year-old population, compared 
to 0–5 for South Africa and Turkey. This is because all 
4-year-olds and above are already enrolled in pre-
primary compulsory education (and so 4–5-year-olds 
are excluded from this assessment). Public spending on 
this older age group is 0.4 per cent of GDP. Therefore 
total annual spending on 0–5 years in the ideal univer-
sal scenario 4 would be 3.2 per cent of GDP, very similar 
to the mid-pay universal scenario of South Africa.
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TABLE 6-2 
Gross and net investment in childcare provision, Uruguay (2017)
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Enrolment Universal Universal Medium Universal
Child/staff ratio Basic Improved Ideal Ideal
Pay level Low High High High
Gross annual investment 623 887 1,149 1,464
% GDP 1.2% 1.7% 2.2% 2.8%
Direct tax revenue 141 248 361 473
Indirect tax revenue 54 88 126 165
Current ECEC funding 113 113 113 113
Net funding gap 315 438 550 713
% GDP 0.6% 0.8% 1.0% 1.4%
% self-funding 49% 51% 52% 51%
No. new full-time jobs 30,052 43,803 60,896 80,369
ECEC 19,971 27,859 38,294 50,674
Other sectors 10,082 15,944 22,601 29,695
% pts rise empl. rate 1.1% 1.5% 2.1% 2.8%
% pts rise female empl. rate 1.6% 2.3% 3.2% 4.2%
% pts 14–64 empl. rate 1.3% 1.9% 2.6% 3.5%
% pts 14–64 female empl. rate 2.0% 2.9% 4.0% 5.3%
Note: Percentage point rises in employment rates are given for both 14–64 and 14+ populations as the employment rate based on 
the latter is the official rate used in government statistics. Monetary amounts are in US$ millions (2017).
The magnitude of the employment effects is lower 
than for South Africa. This is expected given that 
the system is already well developed. However, fis-
cal effects are relatively better than for South Africa 
because of a wider reach of the tax system at such 
levels of earnings: About half of the gross investment 
could be recouped through direct and indirect tax 
revenue from increased employment and consump-
tion. As expected, employment rates are increased 
most in the ideal child/staff ratios of scenarios 3 and 4. 
In the ideal universal scenario 4, female employment 
rates (14–64 years) would increase by 5.3 percentage 
points (4.2 points for 14+ rates).
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6.3 
Turkey
For Turkey, only two scenarios are considered with 
a simple adaptation of the IKK study. The first is an 
expansion of services in order to achieve at least the 
average coverage rates of other OECD countries.44 
To that we add a second scenario that consists of 
extrapolating the expansion to reach all children 
under primary-school age. We do not look at current 
child/staff ratios or current pay levels and estimate 
the two coverage scenarios directly with improved 
child/staff ratios set by the norms and standards45 
and with higher pay46. 
Expanding coverage to OECD average levels for chil-
dren aged 0–5 would entail a gross annual investment 
of 2.0 per cent of GDP (Table 7). Such expansion would 
generate close to 660,000 new jobs in the childcare 
industry47 (three quarters as childcare practitioners 
and assistants and the rest in admin and support) and 
more than 350,000 indirect jobs in other sectors.48 A 
universal coverage scenario would require an annual 
investment of 3.7 per cent of GDP and would gener-
ate 2.1 million new permanent full-time jobs, raising 
female employment rates by almost 6 percentage 
points. Given existing gender segregation in employ-
ment, we estimate that 91 per cent of direct jobs 
and 29 per cent of indirect and induced jobs would 
go to women, representing the existing proportions 
of women in childcare and non-childcare industries 
respectively.49 This means that 7 out of 10 jobs would 
go to women overall as a result of such expansion 
in either scenario. This compares to 80 per cent in 
44 As discussed in IKK 2015.
45 As per ibid.
46 As per Ilkkaraçan and Kim 2018.
47 These new jobs in ECEC services include 611,386 jobs 
as a result of the childcare coverage expansion (same 
estimates as in IKK 2015) and 46,459 additional childcare 
practitioners and assistants in existing facilities owing to 
improved child/staff ratios across the board.
48 107,000 indirect jobs (as in IKK 2015) and 245,000 induced 
jobs, including 14,000 jobs induced by the increased 
consumption of the additional staff in existing facili-
ties. Estimation of induced jobs has been carried out by 
Ilkkaraçan and Kim 2018.
49 Eurostat 2018.
Uruguay and 75-80 per cent in South Africa. The differ-
ence could be explained by the much lower proportion 
of women in the employed population in Turkey (30 
per cent) compared to that in the other two countries 
(both at 45 per cent). 
Fiscal effects from increased direct and indirect tax 
revenue would result in a self-funding rate of about 47 
per cent in both scenarios, reducing the net funding 
needs to 1.1 and 2.0 per cent of GDP, respectively. The 
ECEC wage costings and estimations of fiscal effects 
assume that 85 per cent of non-direct jobs and 100 
per cent of ECEC jobs are registered for social secu-
rity. This differs slightly from IKK (2015), which found 
through their job-matching estimations that about 
85 per cent of all new jobs would be registered for 
social security (and that 85 per cent of all jobs were 
direct jobs, albeit they only estimated indirect effects 
in that study). For comparison, if we assume a scenario 
in which 85 per cent of all jobs are registered (which 
implies reducing the gross annual investment by the 
amount of employer social security contributions no 
longer applicable to 15 per cent of ECEC jobs but also 
reducing tax revenue for more jobs), the fiscal recoup 
(self-funding) rate would be very similar at 48 per cent 
while reducing the gross investment in the universal 
scenario by $500 million. If, by contrast, all jobs cre-
ated were assumed to be registered for social security, 
the gross investment would be unchanged but the 
fiscal recoup would be higher, given that all the non-
direct jobs would become liable to income tax and 
social security contributions and not just 85 per cent 
of them. The difference is not huge but not negligible 
either, with a fiscal recoup rate rising to 50 per cent in 
the universal scenario thanks to an additional $900 
million tax revenue (0.1 per cent of GDP).
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TABLE 6-3 
Gross and net investment in childcare provision, Turkey (2014)
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Enrolment OECD Universal
Staff ratio N&S N&S
Pay/qualifications Higher Higher
Total gross investment 18,738 34,607
% GDP 2.0% 3.7%
Current ECEC spend 1,435 1,435
Direct tax revenue 5,973 12,069
Indirect tax revenue 1,429 2,881
Net funding gap 9,901 18,223
% GDP 1.1% 2.0%
% self-funding 47.2% 47.3%
New jobs ECEC 657,844 1,381,635
New jobs other 352,172 751,491
New total jobs 1,010,017 2,133,127
% women 69% 69%
% point rise employment rate all 1.9% 4.1%
% point rise employment rate women 2.7% 5.7%
Source: adapted from IKK 2015 and Ilkkaraçan and Kim 2018.
Notes: Monetary amounts in US$ millions (2014). N&S stands for norms and standards.
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7.
DISCUSSION
Table 8 shows a comparison of the countries studied according to a universal scenario with 
the most generous but plausible parameters (on pay, child/staff ratios and qualifications). The 
range of annual investment needed as a percentage of GDP would be between 2.8 per cent 
in Uruguay and 3.7 per cent in Turkey, with 3.2 per cent in South Africa. In Uruguay, however, 
as noted above, comparable amounts for the same population of children (all 0–5-year-olds) 
would actually be around 3.2 per cent of GDP as well (0.4 per cent spent on 4–5-year-olds). 
Table 8 also shows comparable results from the UK simulation, with the level of gross invest-
ment to provide universal pre-school childcare services corresponding to 3.1 per cent of GDP.50 
Despite having the least generous child/staff ratios 
of the four countries—a significant factor in the 
total cost of provision—Turkey’s relatively higher 
cost (as a percentage of GDP) may be due to the 
markedly higher overhead (non-staff) costs of child-
care centres compared to the other countries (40 per 
cent vs about 10 per cent). Wages paid to childcare 
workers in Turkey are also slightly higher than in 
the other countries, with main practitioners paid 
2.5 times more than average earnings compared to 
twice in Uruguay and 1.7 times more in the United 
Kingdom (and in South Africa, just under the level of 
mean earnings of employees).
Cross-country differences in the fiscal effects and the 
percentage of the investment that is ‘self-funding’ 
in the short term are mainly due to differences in 
pay and the reach of the fiscal system. In the United 
Kingdom, the tax take is much larger than in the other 
countries, with 64 per cent of the gross investment 
being recouped in direct and indirect tax revenue. The 
UK self-funding rate is even higher (88 per cent) when 
50 De Henau 2017a.
social security spending is taken into account. Reduced 
spending on its complex scheme of out-of-work and 
in-work means-tested benefits is significant. It was 
calculated by a tax-benefit model based on calibrated 
estimates of increased employment and working 
hours by economically inactive or underemployed 
mothers of pre-school children as well as unemployed 
people.51
This pattern of tax revenue differences is not surpris-
ing as lower-income countries have less capacity to 
generate tax revenue from employment or consump-
tion. Other forms of funding could be mobilized 
through borrowing and aid, along with new taxes.52 
As explained earlier, the case for borrowing to fund 
social infrastructure is strong given the large returns 
expected over the life course of children who benefit 
from better childcare, although some of these effects 
(on their parental employment and earnings) is likely 
to be partly reflected already in the short-term fiscal 
effects estimated here (those new jobs that are taken 
up by mothers). 
51 De Henau 2017a.
52 As described in Ortiz et al. 2017.
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TABLE 7-1
Comparative results of universal provision of high quality in four countries
 South Africa Turkey Uruguay United Kingdom (2014)
 2017 2014 2017 w/ social sec. w/o social sec.
Enrolment Universal Universal Universal Universal
No. children 0–2 years per staff 4.5 5 3.5 2.8
Pay/qualifications Medium / high High / high High / high High / high
Total gross investment 11,347 34,607 1,464 94,149
% GDP 3.2% 3.7% 2.8% 3.1%
% staff costs in total 90% 60% 92% 88%
Current ECEC spend 201 1,435 113 8,264
Direct tax revenue 1,376 12,069 473 34,779
Indirect tax revenue 2,428 2,881 165 17,410
Soc. security spend - - - 22,296 -
Net funding gap 7,343 18,223 713 11,400 33,696
% GDP 2.1% 2.0% 1.4% 0.4% 1.1%
% self-funding 35% 47% 51% 88% 64%
New jobs ECEC 1,558,574 1,381,635 50,674 1,087,820
New jobs other 770,514 751,491 29,695 782,490
New total jobs 2,329,087 2,133,127 80,369 1,870,310
% women 81% 69% 78% 75%
% pt rise employment rate all 6.3% 4.1% 3.5% 4.6%
% pt rise employment rate women 10.1% 5.7% 5.3% 6.8%
Notes: The UK scenario with social security spending (‘w/ social sec.’ in table) adds to the fiscal effects an estimation of the reduced 
social security spending on out-of-work and in-work means-tested benefits (Universal Credit) as a result of taking up the jobs (see 
De Henau 2017a for details on the estimation method). Child/staff ratios for children under 3 are reported as average across different 
age groups and all correspond to the most generous option of each country’s scenarios. Amounts are in nominal US$ millions at 
current exchange rates (2014 for Turkey and the United Kingdom and 2017 for South Africa and Uruguay). Employment rates are 
measured on the working-age population.
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An indication of the minimum number of years to 
be maintained at earning potential is given in Table 
9,  for a mother who uses childcare for two children. 
Table 9 also shows the average gender earning gap 
observed in each country to illustrate the magnitude 
of the child-related penalty that could be overturned. 
The gender earning gap (for a given age group) is 
measured as the relative difference between the 
average annual gross earnings of male employees 
of that age group and the average earnings of all 
women of the same age group, based on earnings of 
female employees that are averaged across the whole 
female population, employed and not employed (see 
Appendix III for details).. Such gap approximates the 
penalty that women face relative to men owing to 
the cumulative impact of lower employment rates, 
lower working hours and lower wage rates. Note that 
both Turkey and Uruguay have a gender earning gap 
almost entirely due to differences in employment 
rates and hours worked rather than hourly wages. In 
South Africa and the United Kingdom, the earning 
gap is influenced by differences in employment rates 
and working hours as well as in hourly wages.
TABLE 7-2 
Gender earning gaps,cost of childcare and years to break even fiscally
 South Africa Turkey Uruguay United 
Kingdom
Annual childcare cost per child (% average earnings) 20% 32% 59% 63%
Gap to earning potential 66% 71% 51% 54%
No. years to break even 14.6 11.0 11.7 7.5
Source: own calculations using data on employment, wages and tax schedule of each country (see Appendix III for details).
As Table 9 shows, the minimum number of years to 
be maintained at average earning potential is well 
below a typical mother’s working life. This supports 
the claim that investing in high-quality childcare is 
fiscally affordable, and can even lead to fiscal surplus 
over the lifetime of the beneficiaries. The fiscal claw-
back will be shortest in the UK and longest in South 
Africa. Despite a relatively large earning gap that can 
be closed, the tax reach remains low in South Africa 
compared to the other three countries, making it 
longer to break even. By contrast, although annual 
childcare costs in the simulated system are relatively 
high in the UK (63% of average earnings) compared 
to the other three countries, the fiscal recoup is the 
shortest because of a much greater tax differential.
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8.
CONCLUSION
Providing universal childcare services of high quality may be a significant investment, but it is 
a necessary one to foster better gender economic equality and to achieve several of the SDGs 
set out in Agenda 2030. It also generates more jobs than equivalent investment in less labour-
intensive industries such as construction, while sharing with it similar infrastructure proper-
ties in terms of delivering essential public goods, in this case in the form of a well looked-after 
population. With this in mind, this paper has shown how a method for costing and evaluating 
different scenarios of childcare provision can be replicated for different countries while argu-
ing for considering wider effects on employment and short-term tax revenue. 
The design of a country’s tax system as well as its 
labour market conditions play a significant role in 
determining the net investment required for develop-
ing high-quality services accessible to all children and 
their caregivers. Further research is needed to refine 
the crude results obtained here, using microecono-
metric models to estimate the take-up by parents 
of both the new childcare places and the new jobs. 
Replication of this study to other countries, provided 
data are available, can be done as well, and we expect 
similar results in countries with similar demographic 
structures and average wages relative to the income 
tax bands, given the labour-intensive nature of the 
programme.
But whatever the fiscal and employment effects that 
might be found, such outcomes should not be the 
only indicators of feasibility or attractiveness of a 
policy of universal childcare. Providing the care that 
people need—and thus opportunities for children to 
fulfil their best potential in life—should remain the 
main objective in its own right and deserves proper 
funding on a sustainable basis. The rewards of such 
investment reach far beyond economic benefits.
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APPENDICES
appendix i
Sources and data
TABLE A.1
Sources of Table 1: Enrolment, staff ratios, qualifications, public spending
South Africa Turkey Uruguay
Enrolment rates General Household Survey 2016 IKK 2015
Registro Nacional de Cen-
tros de Educación Infantil 
Privados; SIPI de INAU
Opening hours EPRI 2014 – average hours of audited centres IKK 2015 Plan CAIF 2015
Child/staff ratios EPRI 2014 IKK 2015 Plan CAIF 2015
Practitioners’ qualifications EPRI 2014 IKK 2015 Plan CAIF 2015
Public spending National Treasury 2017 IKK 2015 Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas 2014
TABLE A.2
Population of children by age group
South Africa (2017) Turkey (2014) Uruguay (2017)
0–17 months 1,710,560 3,717,426 68,431
18–35 months 1,764,964 -- 68,681
36–65 months 2,986,003 3,779,761 45,972
Sources: Statistics South Africa 2017; IKK 2015; INE 2017. Population of 36–65-month-olds in Uruguay is actually limited to 36–47 
months (target population of ECEC expansion).
TABLE A.3 
Hourly wage rate per ECEC staff qualification and pay level scenario, South Africa (ZAR)
High (NQF 7) Medium (NQF 5) Low (NQF 5)
Lower qualification (NQF4) 20.19 20.19 10.61
Higher qualification (NQF7 or NQF 5) 170.37 59.09 59.09
Sources in main report.
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TABLE A.4 
Monthly wage per ECEC staff type and pay level scenario, Uruguay (Uruguayan pesos)
 Low pay Medium pay High pay
Childcare staff:
Teacher/practitioner (40 hr) 47,295 52,243 57,191
Educator/assistant (40 hr) 24,774 27,366 29,958
Other staff:
Psychologist/social worker (20 hr) 27,610 27,610 27,610
Psychometrician (32 hr) 44,176 44,176 44,176
Cooking and cleaning (40 hr) 20,045 20,045 20,045
Assistant administrator (30 hr) 16,700 16,700 16,700
Source: ANEP 2017.
TABLE A.5 
Annual earnings of staff in ECEC centre, Turkey (Turkish lira)
 Gross
Teacher/practitioner 39,166
Educator/assistant 17,911
Other staff in centre 17,911
Source: Own estimations based on Ilkkaraçan and Kim 2018 and distributed around mean of 25,980 Turkish lira (median full-time 
earnings of childcare staff) for staff in centre. The ratio of teacher pay to assistant/other pay is that of university qualified to high 
school qualified staff of 2.19 found in IKK 2015 (Table 13).
investing in free universal childcare 
in south africa, turkey and uruguay 31
appendix II 
Explanatory note of employment and  
fiscal effects for each country
Following De Henau et al. (2016) and IKK (2015), the 
estimation of employment effects uses input-output 
tables (I-O) available in each country to derive the 
indirect and induced effects of the childcare invest-
ment policy. Specific estimations were carried out in 
each country to account for the differences in avail-
able data and structure of the I-O tables.
South Africa
The South African I-O tables do not distinguish the 
education sector or the care sector from other activi-
ties carried out by the Government. All public sector 
activities are recorded under the ‘public administra-
tion’ industry category so that the ‘education’ industry 
and the ‘health and social care’ industry include only 
private sector activities. Because the vast majority of 
education services and a large proportion of health-
care services are public, it is impossible to use either 
industry’s input structure to derive the input structure 
that a public childcare sector system would entail.
Instead, we have calculated the indirect effects by 
looking at the industrial structure of inputs to exist-
ing childcare centres based on the early childhood 
development (ECD) audit, such as rent, food and 
material.53 We have mapped these onto the relevant 
sectors available in the I-O tables (energy, retail, etc.). 
The indirect effect is calculated based on the propor-
tion of each input as a direct cash injection into their 
respective sector for a given amount of childcare 
investment. So, for example, if food is 20 per cent of 
the input into a childcare centre, then for each bil-
lion invested in childcare, 200 million will be injected 
53 EPRI 2014.
directly in the food-related industries (which we have 
assumed as the wholesale and retail industry in the 
I-O table). Then we can calculate the indirect effects 
of that cash injection in wholesale/retail. We repeat 
the process for each category of input and add all the 
indirect effects and their own direct effects to obtain 
the indirect effect of investing in childcare.
For the induced effects, we have used the same 
method as that explained in De Henau et al. (2016) to 
derive induced employment multipliers, but instead 
of injecting cash into a particular industry that we 
could not identify (i.e., education), we have estimated 
the rise in household disposable income from the 
new jobs and calculated the employment effects by 
treating the household income rise as a direct cash 
injection into the household sector.
The fiscal effects are based on the 2017/2018 tax sys-
tem using gross wages of (full-time) childcare staff 
corresponding to each pay level scenario (see Table 
A.3). For the jobs created in the rest of the economy, 
we have estimated the tax due on average for three 
types of jobs: those not assessed and not paying 
taxes; those not assessed but potentially paying taxes 
(and assuming that they did); and those assessed and 
paying taxes. The size of each group determines the 
weights in the tax calculations. The weighted average 
salary and income tax due is obtained as per Table 
A.6. Each group is assumed to pay the unemployment 
insurance contribution rates (1 per cent employer and 
1 per cent employee).
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TABLE A.6 
Mean earnings and income tax due by type of employment registration (2017)
No. employees Average salary (ZAR) Average tax due (ZAR)
No-tax employees 6,962,187 37,876 0
Taxed but unassessed 1,866,540 132,816 10,272
Assessed and taxed 4,775,950 222,683 29,072
Total/average 13,604,677 115,778 11,615
Source: National Treasury and SARS 2016, adjusted for 2017 prices.
Indirect (consumption) taxes are calculated by apply-
ing the average indirect tax incidence on disposable 
income, which is estimated at 16 per cent on average 
for middle deciles.54 This includes VAT, excise duties 
and fuel levy.
Uruguay
For Uruguay, the method is the same as that of De 
Henau et al. (2016) and De Henau (2017a), with the 
education sector used as the industry in which the 
investment in childcare takes place, given the similar 
qualification of childcare staff and the aim to develop 
an education-based system of childcare with costs 
inputs resembling the school system. The most recent 
available input-output table dates from 2005.
Salaries are calculated with a typical 25 per cent extra 
in added benefits (akin to 13th month and holiday 
pay), and tax and social security contributions are cal-
culated on that augmented basis, applying the 2017 
schedule.
Indirect tax incidence (VAT + excise duties) is esti-
mated at 16.7 per cent on average of the total 
household private consumption expenditure. Propen-
sity to consume is estimated at 83 per cent of average 
disposable income, so the indirect tax incidence on 
disposable income is 13.8 per cent and is applied to 
all incomes levels of the new jobs as per the other 
countries. Calculations are made using data from the 
National Accounts provided by the Banco Central de 
54 Inchauste et al. 2015.
Uruguay and the Dirección General Impositiva for the 
year 2015.55 
Turkey
The calculations of the employment effects for Turkey 
follow the model developed by IKK (2015) using the 
input structure of the typical childcare centre they 
have estimated based on the field survey of existing 
provision. As noted earlier, the amount of overhead per 
centre has been kept constant at the level of IKK (2015) 
despite the higher wages assumed in this paper.56 
This means that the indirect employment effect is 
the same as that of IKK (2015) for the OECD scenario 
and proportional to it for the universal scenario. The 
Type I employment multiplier derived from IKK (2015) 
and used to extrapolate indirect employment creation 
in the universal scenario is 1.18. Induced effects have 
been estimated by Ilkkaraçan and Kim (2018) using a 
similar approach to that used in the other countries.57 
We have adapted their results to also account for 
the employment effect induced by increased con-
sumption of the additional childcare staff in existing 
facilities (through improved child/staff ratios).
Income tax and social security contributions (SSC) 
are calculated on gross income assuming all jobs cre-
ated in ECEC services are registered for social security 
and are permanent, thereby liable to SSC. We have 
assumed that only 85 per cent of non-ECEC jobs are 
55 Available on the website of the Instituto Nacional de 
Estadistica: http://www.ine.gub.uy/cuentas-nacionales.
56 And in Ilkkaraçan and Kim 2018.
57 Based on De Henau et al. 2016.
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registered.58 All non-direct jobs are assumed to be 
paid at the average level of earnings of 2,642 Turkish 
lira per month.59
Calculations for direct tax revenue require know-
ing the family type and employment situation of 
any partner in order to determine a minimum living 
allowance used as an income tax rebate. The lowest 
amount is given to single childless people (about 80 
Turkish lira a month in 2014) and it increases if the 
person has a non-employed partner and with the 
number of children. However, deductions for children 
only apply to one partner so if the newly employed 
person lives with a partner who is already employed 
and already claims the discount for their children, 
that newly employed person would receive the same 
discount as a single person. Given that most jobs are 
likely to be taken up by women, who are most likely to 
be either single or married with an employed spouse, 
we have assumed that all new jobs would attract 
the single-rate discount. Ilkkaraçan and Kim (2018) 
58 Following the suggestion in Ilkkaraçan and Kim 2018, based 
on IKK 2015.
59 As explained in Ilkkaraçan and Kim 2018.
calculated discounts based on a share of 65 per cent 
of married people taking up the jobs as per the cur-
rent proportion in the population (and assumed these 
would all be with a non-employed partner and with 
two children). If this was applied here, the difference 
in impact on the fiscal recoup would be small with 
only about $260 million less in income tax, pushing 
down the self-funding rate from 47.3 per cent to 46.6 
per cent in the universal scenario.60 
Indirect tax incidence (from both general and specific 
consumption taxes) is estimated at 14.8 per cent of 
disposable income. It is calculated on the basis of 
the total revenue from VAT and specific consumption 
taxes (such as excise duties) found in Table 4.65 of 
the OECD revenue statistics.61 Such revenue is then 
divided by the household final consumption expendi-
ture.62 Then we use the household gross savings ratio 
of 13.6 per cent in 201463 to determine average dispos-
able income and thus the tax incidence.
60 See details of how the discount is calculated (with 
figures for 2015) at https://turkishlaborlaw.com/
faq/332-how-to-calculate-minimum-living-allowance-2.
61 OECD 2017b.
62 TurkStat 2016a.
63 TurkStat 2016b.
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appendix III 
Calculations of the gender earning gap
For South Africa and the United Kingdom, the calcula-
tions of the total earning gap between women and 
men of the same age are done using data on annual 
earnings of male employees and compared to annual 
earnings of female employees averaged over the total 
population of employed, unemployed and economi-
cally inactive women. 
Data for South Africa are taken from the Labour 
Dynamics in South Africa (2016) interactive data avail-
able online.64 
Data for the United Kingdom are from the Annual Sur-
vey of Hours and Earnings (2014 – revised), Table 6 (age 
groups) and from the Labour Force Survey quarterly 
data (file A05 – labour force status by age group).65 
For Turkey, we used the national time-use survey of 
2014, reporting average time in employment per day 
for different age groups. Data on hourly wages are 
available from the European Structure of Earnings 
Survey (ESES) (2014).66 Because time in employment 
is measured across the whole age group (including 
those not in employment), the total earnings aver-
aged over the group is simply the product of the 
hourly wage of employees by the average number of 
hours in employment per day (multiplied by 7 and 52 
to get annual earnings). Hourly gender wage gaps in 
Turkey for those aged 25–54 are negative (-15 per cent), 
meaning salaried women earn on average 15 per cent 
more than salaried men. But the gap in employment 
is huge in favour of men, which more than compen-
sates for the reversed hourly gap.
64 http://interactive.statssa.gov.za:8282/webview/.
65 Both available online at www.ons.gov.uk .
66 Both data sets are available from the Turkish Statistical 
Institute TurkStat at http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PreTablo.
do?alt_id=1009  (statistics by theme). 
For Uruguay we used the same method as for Turkey, 
although we were unable to find time-use data by age. 
INE (2014) provides data on total unpaid and paid work 
carried out by women and men aged 14+ (Sistema de 
Información de Género, Inmujeres-MIDES, en base a 
Módulo EUT 2013, INE), available at http://www.ine.
gub.uy/web/guest/encuesta-de-uso-del-tiempo-eut-.
For hourly wages, the Encuesta Continua de los Hog-
ares, December 2017, provides estimates of hourly 
wages of employees by sex, averaged over quarters 
of 2017 (in 2017 prices): UYU 177.3 for women (+15% 
of taxable benefits) and UYU 185.04 for men (+15% 
of taxable benefits). This yields a gender hourly wage 
gap of 4.2 per cent.67 
We use data on the share of paid work in total work 
for women provided by the time-use report and the 
hourly wage to derive their total average earnings of 
all women (in 2017 prices), to be compared with aver-
age earnings of male employees.
67 INE 2018b.
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